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Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law:
Genius, Value, and Gendered Visions of the Creative Self
Carys J. Craig*
I.

Introduction

Copyright law protects works of literature, art, music, and drama. As such, it is
fundamentally concerned with the value of cultural works—both the recognition and the
creation of this value. Yet it is seldom acknowledged that copyright law makes or requires any
“value judgment” in the sense of an aesthetic evaluation of copyright’s subject matter. Indeed, it
is often emphasized that copyright protects original works of authorship regardless of their
quality or merit; after all, anything from blank accounting forms to corporate logos may qualify
as protected “works” for copyright purposes. That copyright protection demands the satisfaction
of only the most minimal of qualitative standards does not, however, dispose of the larger claim
that forms the basis of this chapter: our copyright system is dominated by a particular aesthetic
theory or idea. Any attempt to justify the rights established by the copyright system over artistic
works must presuppose an aesthetic theory of sorts in order to explain what is protected and
why (as well as what is not protected or permitted, and why not). While not based on the quality
of copyright’s subject matter, these explanatory efforts will point to its nature as original
literary or artistic expression, which thus deserves or requires some form of legally recognized
reward. We simply cannot justify copyright without ascribing some value and significance to
the particular expressive works in which it vests, and the creative acts and actors that it
privileges. Seen in this light, it could seem almost audacious to claim that copyright law is
aesthetically agnostic.
This book pulls at the many loose threads of our intellectual property system to reveal,
amidst the tangle of legal doctrine and complex concepts, the gaps where diverse interests and
perspectives are, much like dropped stitches in a blanket, omissions that threaten to ruin the
effectiveness and attractiveness of the whole project. In this chapter, my goal is to uncover, in
copyright’s most basic patterns, the hidden aesthetics of copyright law as viewed from a critical
feminist perspective. My suggestion is that conceptions of aesthetic value and its production are
stitched into the very fabric of copyright law, defining its contours and determining the
purposes it serves—and what is more, these conceptions of aesthetic value are fundamentally
gendered.
The chapter proceeds, in Part II, to draw the connections between copyright law and
aesthetics in general, and then advances the claim that a particular aesthetic theory—that of
romantic aestheticism—dominates our copyright system. Part III describes the author-figure
that occupies center-stage in copyright discourse and employs feminist critiques of the concepts
*
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of “originality” and “genius” to suggest that copyright’s protagonist, the romantic author, is not
gender-neutral but rather fundamentally patriarchal. Throughout, this discussion implies
copyright’s complicity in the exclusion and marginalization of women and female creativity in
the literary and artistic domain. In Part IV, I survey some of the ways in which feminist
aesthetics might disrupt copyright’s most central assumptions. Rather than offer a
comprehensive account of any particular line of critique and its full doctrinal implications, my
aim here is to convey the critical potential of harnessing feminist aesthetic theories and bringing
them to bear on copyright law. Not only could this effort enhance the diversity of perspectives
represented in the current debates over copyright’s future; it could produce a diversification of
the interests, values and voices that copyright protects.

II.

Copyright and Aesthetic Judgment

A.

Defining Copyright’s Subject Matter

Copyright protects only original works of an artistic, literary, dramatic, or musical
nature. By requiring such classification, the law would seem to demand at least some basic
explanation of what is meant by “art,” what sounds constitute “music,” what symbols, when
strung together might be said to amount to “literary” expression. And yet, copyright
jurisprudence is replete with the insistence that no such assessment of the substance of a work is
required—the determination of whether something is an “artistic work,” we are frequently
assured, has nothing to do with the qualitative evaluation of whether something is good art, bad
art, or even a “work of art.”1 As Alfred Yen put it, “the general irrelevance of aesthetics has
become a cornerstone of copyright jurisprudence.”2 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., for example, Justice Holmes famously warned, “[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”3 In the House of Lords
judgment in George Hensher v Restawhile, Justice Reid wrote of “a trend of authority with
which I agree that a court ought not to be called on to make an aesthetic judgment. Judges have
to be experts in the use of the English language but they are not experts in art or aesthetics.”4 In
DRG Inc. v Datafile Ltd., Justice Reed warned that “[r]equiring Courts to determine what is
‘artistic’ . . . is not a happy situation,”5 and concluded that the phrase “artistic work” is used in
copyright legislation merely “as a general description of works which find expression in a visual
medium.”6 Yet, if the institution of copyright law is indeed aimed at the “progress of the arts”7
1

See, e.g. George Hensher Ltd. v Restawhile Upholstery Ltd. [1976] A.C. 64 (H.L.) 78-9 (U.K.) (Lord Reid stating
that “it may be misleading to equate artistic craftsmanship with a work of art. ‘Work of art’ is generally associated
more with the fine arts than with craftsmanship and may be setting too high a standard.”).
2
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 249 (1998).
3
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
4
Hensher, [1976] A.C. at 78.
5
DRG Inc. v Datafile Ltd., [1988] 2 C.F. 243, para. 12 (Can.).
6
Id. at para. 15.
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and the encouragement of “works of the arts and intellect,”8 this refusal to give substantive legal
definition to “art” might seem strange or troublesome: can we really make, apply, and justify
laws that encourage the creation of something we refuse to define?
Alfred Yen has argued convincingly that the judicial insistence upon avoiding explicit
aesthetic judgments in copyright cases maintains a perceived distinction between aesthetic and
legal reasoning that is entirely illusory; it rests on a particular understanding of the nature of
legal reasoning as a rule-bound exercise in formal logic.9 A Canadian judge expressly trying to
avoid judging the artistic merit of an architectural work nicely captured the connection:
It is gratifying to think that those who drafted this Act were content to leave such
aesthetic responsibility to the judiciary, but it is, I think, dangerous to assume
such intention. . . . The good art of today is almost invariably the bad Art of
tomorrow, for aesthetic standards and values change from generation to
generation. . . . The legal approach is, as a rule, to elevate precedent and to view
innovations somewhat askance. The function of the Judge has always been to
weigh evidence and propound existing law. In the arts, evidence of aesthetic
values is, as a rule, merely the heated opinion of prejudiced adherents.10
Implicit in this passage is the mistaken assumption identified by Yen: “[a]esthetic reasoning is
subjective and indeterminate, while legal reasoning is objective and rigorous.” To the contrary,
Yen argues, “judges necessarily show a preference for certain aesthetic perspectives when they
decide cases because copyright law simply requires aesthetic choices.”11 Consider the need,
when establishing copyright protection, to distinguish between artistic works and mere tools or
“useful articles;” between “works of artistic craftsmanship” and basic craftwork; and between
“sculptures” and any other three-dimensional product. Courts have denied making aesthetic
judgments when determining, for example, that furniture prototypes, while pleasing to the eye,
are not works of artistic craftsmanship12; that colored rods for teaching mathematics, while
“attractive,” are not artistic works13; that color-coded filing labels, while functionally useful, are
nonetheless artistic works14; that costume helmets, although not actually useful, are not
sculptures15; that jewelry designs, while primarily for “visual effect,” might be more
appropriately protected as “industrial designs”;16 et cetera.
7

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34, at para. 30 (Can.).
9
Yen, supra note 2, at 249.
10
Hay & Hay Constr. v. Sloan, [1957] 27 C.P.R. 132, at para. 5 (Can.).
11
Yen, supra note 2, at 250.
12
George Hensher Ltd. v Restawhile Upholstery Ltd. [1976] A.C. 64 (H.L.) (U.K.)
13
Cuisenaire v. South West Imps. Ltd. [1969] S.C.R. 208 (Can.).
14
DRG Inc. v Datafile Ltd., [1988] 2 C.F. 243 (Can.).,
15
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39.
16
Pyrrha Design Inc. v 623735 Saskatchewan Ltd., 2004 FCA 423 (Can.).
8
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Such determinations are not simply the mechanical application of legal rules or
established precedent, but require the privileging of one interpretation over a competing
alternative interpretation, one precedent over another. In efforts to avoid appearing to judge
artistic merit, Yen argues, courts are actually choosing between different aesthetic theories on a
case by case basis: they might ask whether contemplating the work produces an aesthetic
response in people17 (aesthetic formalism); whether a work’s creator intended the work to
satisfy an aesthetic interest18 (intentionalism); or whether a work has been recognized in the artworld as art19 (institutionalism). Simply put, the selection between different approaches to
identifying artistic works is, in itself, the expression of an aesthetic preference.20
My point is not to decry the presence of aesthetic judgment in legal or judicial decisionmaking. The significance of recognizing the aesthetic judgments in copyright decision-making
is to acknowledge the inevitability of aesthetic bias in copyright jurisprudence. For Yen, since
“no aesthetic perspective can be neutral and all-encompassing”,21 the goal is to increase
awareness, to manage aesthetic subjectivity, to constrain bias, and to encourage openmindedness. Moreover, by acknowledging that “aesthetically subjective decision making is the
only possible approach in copyright cases,”22 we can appreciate the importance of identifying
and critically evaluating the dominant, purportedly neutral aesthetic bias that has so
fundamentally shaped the copyright system. If it is impossible for legal reasoning to separate
copyright from aesthetics, the question is “not whether aesthetics should affect copyright law,
but how.”23
This is a crucial question to ask when considering the capacity of copyright law to either
enhance or limit cultural diversity. Building on Yen’s observations, John Tehranian explains
that copyright’s aesthetic adjudications:

17

See, e.g. Hensher, [1976] A.C. at 78 (Lord Reid stating “If any substantial section of the public genuinely
admires and values a thing for its appearance and gets pleasure or satisfaction, whether emotional or intellectual,
from looking at it, I would accept that it is artistic although many others may think it meaningless or common or
vulgar.”).
18
See, e.g., Cuisennaire v. South West Imps. Ltd. [1968] 1 Ex. C.R. 493 at para. 73 (Noel J. stating, “An artistic
work, in my view, must to some degree at least, be a work that is intended to have an appeal to the aesthetic
senses…as an important or one of the important objects for which the work is brought into being.” See also Hay &
Hay Constr. v. Sloan, [1957] 27 C.P.R. 132, at para. 5 (per Stewart J.: “the tribunal should not attempt to exercise a
personal aesthetic judgment but to consider the intent of the creator and its result.”)
19
See, e.g. Hensher, [1976] A.C. at 94, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale: “the most cogent evidence [of whether the
subject matter is a work of artistic craftsmanship] is likely to be from those who are themselves acknowledged
artist-craftsmen, or from those who are concerned with the training of artist-craftsmen . . . ”.
20
This degree of choice implies the kind of inherent subjectivity or discretion in judicial decision making that is
denied or decried by legal formalists—and has been revealed and trumpeted by critical legal scholars. See John
Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration and Control, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1237.
21
Yen, supra note 2, at 251.
22
Id. at 301.
23
Id. at 251, fn 14.
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inextricably affect the type of works we, as a society, receive from our artists. . . .
Even more fundamentally, however, aesthetic judgments can serve to both
maintain and preserve existing power structures. The seemingly neutral laws of
copyright, therefore, have the potential to create a hierarchy of culture that serves
hegemonic interests.24
Copyright law does not protect everything. In choosing what to protect, it favors certain
forms of artistic and intellectual expression while it restricts or prohibits others. If these
choices—these selective protections and prohibitions—are influenced by an underlying but
largely invisible aesthetic bias, then a critical legal perspective demands that we ask who it
benefits and who it disproportionately burdens, and what role it plays in consolidating existing
inequalities. More particularly, from a feminist critical perspective, we might ask, does this
aesthetic bias have masculinist underpinnings? Amy Newmann warns that “at least historically,
aestheticist thinking has been a vehicle for blatantly masculinist ideologies privileging a certain
kind of aesthetic experience . . . arising within male corporeality.”25 If this is so, we might
reasonably suspect that copyright’s hidden aesthetics maintain and perpetuate a gendered vision
of authorship, creativity, and aesthetic worth.

B.

Defining Copyright’s Threshold: The Aesthetics of Originality

Copyright emerged in its modern form in the eighteenth century, conferring on the
author for the first time a proprietary interest in his text.26 It is not by coincidence that this same
period saw a fundamental shift in conceptions of authorship in general. In her fascinating book
on the evolving conception of plagiarism, Marilyn Randall explains that, while prior to the
eighteenth century, imitation had been the aesthetic norm, the eighteenth century saw a “shift
from a poetics of imitation to a valorization of originality.”27 Aspirations towards imagination,
novelty, creativity, and originality took on great significance in the aesthetics of the Romantic
period, which emphasized the individual author and the author-ity that flows from the sincere
expression of personal genius.28 Romantic aestheticism elevated the artist as individualist: art
was “to be created and evaluated in isolation from ethical, social or political considerations—as
a pure expression of human nature that bursts forth independently and individualistically.” 29 In
this view, true authorship captures the essence of human individuality.

24

Tehranian, supra note 20, at 1280.
Amy Newmann, Aestheticism, Feminism, and the Dynamics of Reversal in AESTHETICS IN FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE 193, 194 (Hilde Hein & Carolyn Korsmeyer eds., 1993).
25

26

See Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23
REPRESENTATIONS 51, 54-58 (1988).
27
MARILYN RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT AND POWER 47 (2003).
28
Id. at 51.
29
Newman, supra note 25, at 194.
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The well-known words of Justice Homes in Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co.
give context to this understanding in the copyright realm: “The [original work] is the personal
reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”30 The distinction between imitation and originality is
thus intricately tied to the perception of man’s fundamental nature; the man who copies from
another sacrifices his authenticity and obscures his intrinsic worth. The valorization of the
individual author and his originality, and the resulting denigration of imitation or copying, is
axiomatic in modern copyright law. Copyright law, which protects and encourages the creation
of “original works,” prohibits and discourages copying and the production of unauthorized
derivative works.
From its inception with the passing of the Statute of Anne in 1710, modern copyright has
vested in authors. An “author” for copyright purposes is no more and no less than the person
who originates the expression that copyright protects. If an author is defined by his creation of
protectable expression, then the substance of “authorship” is determined by the legal threshold
requirement of “originality.” The originality standard has been a controversial one across time
and place. In the Continental European jurisprudence, it invokes the need for a work to be a
“personal intellectual creation”; in the United States, it requires a minimal amount of
“creativity”; in the United Kingdom, it demands “skill and labour”; in Canada, it involves
something in between creativity and labour, namely, a more than trivial amount of “skill and
judgment.”31 Even at its most elevated, the standard thus requires no more than the exercise of
some minimum of creative choice, with the result that virtually any work that is not simply
copied and involves some degree of choice between different possible options is likely to
qualify. Qualitatively, then, the originality determination typically involves little in the way of
aesthetic evaluation. But it does not follow that it is devoid of aesthetic assumptions.
Importantly, the very premise of originality under any of these interpretative schools is
the origination of a work in the mind of the individual; the expression emanates from him and
his intellectual efforts (however unimpressive it may be). It is, then, not because of the quality
of their substance but just the sheer fact of their individual origination that original works are
thought to merit protection. The work is protected as the “original product of the intellection of
a unique individual (or identifiable individuals).”32 The author who merits protection is “the
person who conceives, who expresses ideas, who composes, who creates the work as a result of
his labour, his qualities and his personal efforts.”33
30

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
See Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in
Copyright Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 375 (2009).
32
Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 291-92
(1992) [hereinafter Woodmansee, On the Author].
33
Ateliers Tango Argentin Inc. v. Festival d’Espagne et d’Amerique Latine Inc. (1997), 84 C.P.R. 3d 56, per Crete
J. (trans.); see also Borrow-Giles Lithographic Company v Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (defining “author”
as “he to whom anything owed its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.”).
31
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This conclusion speaks to the essential individuality and mental isolation of the worthy
“author” as conceived by copyright law. As Jessica Litman explained, “Our copyright law is
based on the charming notion that authors create something from nothing, that works owe their
origin to the authors who produce them.”34 Authorship is constructed in law as an individual
moment of creation, where words or notes or actions are born of a largely internal, independent
process, making them uniquely the author’s. A defining feature of copyright’s underlying
aesthetic philosophy is, therefore, the objective appreciation of originality, authenticity, and the
individuality of the human mind.
A large body of copyright scholarship over the past twenty-five years has sought to
demonstrate the presence of a Romantic conception of authorship in the fundamental concepts,
principles, and adjudication of copyright law.35 Martha Woodmansee, for example, has argued
that our intellectual property laws are rooted in the “reconceptualization of the creative process
which culminated in high Romantic pronouncements . . . to the effect that this process ought to
be solitary, or individual, and introduce ‘a new element into the intellectual universe.’”36 What
is more, she suggests, these laws are themselves “one of the most powerful vehicles of the
modern authorship construct.”37 James Boyle has warned that the myth of the Romantic author
causes us to value some forms of creation over others, and to underestimate the importance of
external sources in the creative process.38 Mark Rose has decried “the persistence of the
discourse of original genius . . . and the reifications of author and work” in copyright law.39 For
Rose, what emerged out of the nineteenth century and continues to cause difficulties for
copyright law todayis “the [romantic] notion of the author as a creative man who by virtue of
imposing the imprint of his unique personality on his original works makes them his own.”40
The distinction between creative (‘productive’) and pseudo-creative (‘reproductive’)
34

Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of
the ‘Author’ 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984) [hereinafter Woodmansee, Genius and the Copyright];
MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (1994);
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee
& Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) [hereinafter
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS]; Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the Genealogy of
Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v Curl (1741), 21
CULTURAL CRITIQUE 197 (1992); see also Molly Nesbitt, What Was an Author? 229 YALE FRENCH STUD. 73
(1987); Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777-1793
30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (1990).
36
Woodmansee, On the Author, supra note 32 at 291.
37
Id. at 291.
38
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 51-60 (1996); James D.A. Boyle The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L.
REV. 625 (1988); see also, Peter Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991
DUKE L.J. 455.
39
ROSE, Authors and Owners, supra note 35 at 141.
40
Mark Rose, Mothers and Authors: Johnson v. Calvert and the New Children of Our Imaginations, 22 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 613, 614 (1996) [hereinafter Rose, Mothers and Authors].
35
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imagination is integral to all Romantic theorists of art; 41 it is also integral to copyright law and
the line that it draws between the original authorship that is to be encouraged and rewarded, and
the unlawful reproduction that is to be prohibited.

III.

The Gendered Author

A.

The Solitary Self

Of course, the reader may say, nothing in this description of copyright’s underlying
Romantic aesthetic has any particular relevance to issues of gender or diversity: after all, men
have no monopoly on originality. But when it comes to philosophizing about the nature of
“mankind” and the ostensibly objective values it entails, feminists have, across decades and
disciplines, sought to show how neutral language and “objective” descriptions bear the marks of
gender, and so construct hierarchies with gendered significance under the guise of “false
universality.”42 The copyright field is no exception. Such feminist critiques are increasingly
being brought to bear directly on the seemingly gender-neutral realm of copyright law to
problematize, deconstruct, and potentially transform the way in which its core concepts,
doctrines, and perceived purposes are understood and realized.43
One starting point for a feminist critique of copyright’s Romantic aesthetics is to draw
the connection between conceptions of authorship and conceptions of selfhood. The authorfigure—this product of the enlightenment era and Lockean notions of self-ownership—is
essentially the familiar protagonist of liberal possessive individualism. As Shelley Wright
explains:
The existing definition of copyright . . . presupposes that individuals live in
isolation from one another, that the individual is an autonomous unit who creates
artistic works and sells them, or permits their sale by others, while ignoring the
individual’s relationship with others within her community, family, ethnic group,
41

CHRISTINE BATTERSBY, GENDER AND GENIUS: TOWARDS A FEMINIST AESTHETICS 145 (1994) [hereinafter
BATTERSBY, GENDER AND GENIUS].
42
Carolyn Korsmeyer, Feminist Aesthetics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (substantive revision
Nov. 7, 2012) available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-aethetics (See definition of ‘Feminist
Aesthetics’).
43
See, e.g., Andrea Abernethy Lunsford, Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of Textual Ownership, 61 C. ENG.
529 (1999); Deborah Halbert, Poaching and Plagiarizing: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111 (Lise Buranen &
Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) [hereinafter Halbert, Poaching]; Malla Pollack, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Public
Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 603 (2006); Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright
Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551 (2006); Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media,
14 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 519 (2006); Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property
Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 183 (2007).
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religion—the very social relations out of which and for the benefit of whom the
individual’s limited monopoly rights are supposed to exist.44
This is an important claim because it opens copyright law to an enormous body of critical
discourse ranging from the political to the aesthetic, and from the communitarian to the
postmodern. Most apt for our purposes here is the critical assertion common to much feminist
political theorizing that this fictional liberal self, with its double-edged claim to individuality
and universalizability, disguises difference, disregards social “situatedness,” and so subsumes
and perpetuates a history of domination, subordination, and exclusion. I have argued elsewhere
that this mythic individualized author is not only profoundly ideological and historically
contingent, but also derives from a strongly gendered vision of the autonomous self:45 it truly
belongs to what Foucault termed the “fundamental category of ‘the-man-and-his-work.’”46
Feminist and other critical theorists challenge the notion of the subject that underpins
this valorization of individuality: the atomized self who transcends society and subjectivity,
labors alone, who acquires rights, owns property, calculates rationally, and transacts freely. The
core objection is, of course, that “[t]he place of the free-willed subject who can transcend
nature's mandates is reserved exclusively for men.”47 If the radically individualized self is the
exclusive domain of men, then must not the same be said of the independent, original author at
the center of copyright law?
The Lockean individual who appropriates through labor by virtue of his solitary efforts,
for example, is a foundational precept in Western property systems, and, I have suggested
elsewhere, a persistent specter in our intellectual property discourse.48 As Carole Pateman has
argued, however, for Locke, “women are excluded from the status of ‘individual’ in the natural
condition.”49 The “masculinist underpinnings” of the Lockean premise of self-ownership are
thus imported into copyright’s theoretical framework with every invocation of the author’s right
to “reap what he has sown” and to enjoy the “fruits of his labor.”50 The well-rehearsed feminist
critique of the liberal subject readily extends to the idea of the “homo economicus” or
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“economic man”51 who dominates copyright’s increasingly utilitarian narratives. As feminist
theorists have shown, the universal subject of the neo-classical economic model—the
unencumbered subject who makes rational calculations on the basis of self-interest—similarly
excludes considerations of human relations, situation, and power. Once revealed, the
positionality of the homo economicus (who most closely resembles the privileged white, male,
heterosexual elite) suggests that “economic rationales are often merely a way to preserve the
patriarchal status quo.”52 Might the same be said when copyright is justified on the basis that
authors, cast in the role economically rational actors, create in response to the incentives offered
by copyright protection?53
For the common law copyright system, whose justifications so depend on the vision of
the industrious, deserving, and rational author, such a conclusion goes to the very heart of the
system, how it works, and who it privileges. Deborah Halbert and other feminist copyright
scholars, building on such theoretical critiques, have sought to show their practical ramifications
by pointing to particular forms of gendered creative practice excluded from copyright’s domain
by virtue of their misalignment with the solitary authorship trope. Thus, for example, the
preparation of food and the fabrication of clothing, both traditionally women’s work relegated
to the domestic realm, have existed largely outside of the intellectual property paradigm, 54 as
have the products of shared creative practices such as quilting and knitting.55 Collaborative and
collective projects, whether based on relationships of care or born of functional necessity, have
been marginalized or problematized by the model of individual, commodified intellectual
production—usually with gendered implications.56
The distinction between fine art and crafts has been a particular focus of feminist
critique. The very concept of art was narrowed to include works produced purely for their
aesthetic virtues, and thus distinguished from arts produced for practical use, which came to be
designated as “crafts.” Making craftworks, though skillful, was not regarded as possessing the
same order of originality. Thus traditional domestic arts, predominantly the domain of women,
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came to be excluded from the realm of art and the records of art history. 57 Indeed, such was the
gendered impact of this “formalist condemnation of the utilitarian” that it might reasonably be
thought to “follow from rather that dictate the rejection of women’s art.”58 I have already
suggested that the distinction between “artistic works” and utilitarian works of craftsmanship
represents an important boundary in the legal limits of copyright protection governed by a
hidden aesthetics. To the extent that the arts-craft boundary disproportionately excluded women
from public recognition in the visual arts, copyright’s boundaries compounded this exclusion by
withholding the benefits of legal protection.
At a more abstract level, the very idea of the transcendent, independent author and the
romantic aestheticism that he embodies has also been the target of feminist aesthetic theorists.
An aesthetic theory that takes as its starting point the artist as unencumbered, universal
individual, must fail to appreciate not only the nature of the creative process, but also the
aesthetic value of the creative work. Estella Lauter explains:
Art is not produced in a rarefied atmosphere that transcends gender
identification. We create as men and women who are influenced by biological
and imaginative mothers and fathers. Far from being a set of discrete,
autonomous art objects, art is deeply contextual . . . [with] multiple relationships
to its contexts.59
Art, then, or the “work” in copyright terms, is not autonomous; it must be seen in context, as
socially and culturally situated, and not as the free-standing, stable product of a transcendent
author. So let us turn now to consider the ways in which these gendered assumptions about the
individuality of the author have informed our aesthetic evaluations of the author’s work (and
worth), and our conceptualization of the author-work relationship.

B.

The Gender of Genius

In the nineteenth century, Marilyn Randall explains, the concept of individual authorship
was compounded by the “great author” phenomenon: originality was the mark of an
individual’s genius. A great author was a “great soul emitting inspired and universal truths,”60
while lesser humans could merely follow suit by learning, imitating, and borrowing. While I
have stressed the masculinist detachment of the originating author-genius, it is interesting to
note that this romantic instantiation of “genius” is just one in an evolving progression of
57
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competing conceptualizations of genius over time. Christine Battersby, describing the
“gendering of genius” suggests that every iteration of the author-genius, from the pre-modern to
the post-modern, has hailed whatever characteristics women were believed, at that time, to most
lack (whether it be passion, reason, madness, or even, most recently, the willingness to discard
the claim to subjective authority).61 Thus, genius has consistently been defined in
contradistinction to the feminine. For example, in the Renaissance period, women were thought
to be too creative and so not sufficiently capable of perceiving objective truth to qualify for the
label of genius.62 For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, writing in the mid-18th century, the basis for
claiming that “women, in general, possess no artistic sensibility . . . nor genius” was that
women’s writings are “as cold and pretty as women; . . . they are a hundred times more
reasoned than impassioned.”63 Women’s failing, then, was a deficiency in passion. Immanuel
Kant, for whom Rousseau was a great hero, wrote his own treatise on aesthetics and the
sublime, 64 which also explicitly excluded women from ranks of genius, now on the basis that
woman are passionate creatures whereas genius is a matter of reason.65 For Kant, women’s
overriding duty was to be beautiful, to pursue feminine qualities of grace, charm, domesticity.
The pursuit of knowledge or deep (as opposed to beautiful) understanding was therefore
defeminizing. The woman who knows Greek or mechanics “might as well even have a beard,”
he wrote, and the woman who succeeds in laborious learning “destroy[s] the merits that are
proper to her sex.”66 Sublime pleasure, meanwhile, was “closed off to all except the ‘moral
man.’”67
Battersby emphasizes that creative women today face problems that derive directly from
a Romantic inheritance—a Romantic aesthetics that built on Kantian epistemology and
produced a conception of genius that is particularly harmful to women:
Our present criteria for artistic excellence have their origins in theories that
specifically and explicitly denied women genius. We still associate the great
artist with certain (male) personality-types, certain (male) social roles, and
certain kinds of (male) energies. . . . Women who want to create must still
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manipulate aesthetic concepts taken from a mythology and biology that were
profoundly anti-female.68
To the extent, then, that copyright law has maintained and incubated this great artist figure in its
rationale and rhetoric, this is a damning indictment of copyright indeed. It surely strikes at the
core of our copyright structures to concede that “[t]he origins of intellectual property law,
authorship, originality, and plagiarism are indebted to understanding creation as the domain of
males who are the only ones authorized to speak and write.”69
Throughout her fascinating book, Battersby advances that argument that genius itself is
male, and constructs the powerful claim that the Romantic notion of genius has consistently
been wielded “to try and beat back the female hordes invading the male space of European
culture.”71 What makes this perhaps most indicative of a continually shifting and evolving
cultural misogyny, she argues, is that Romanticism elevates precisely those attributes that were
previously downgraded as “feminine” (emotionality, sensitivity, spontaneity, self-expression);
but what is seen as natural imperfection in women is regarded as accomplished perfection in a
man.
70

For Battersby, the most egregious or ironic of these male misappropriations of feminine
attributes as indicators of exclusively male genius, is the concept of author as mother—or, as
she describes it, the metaphor of “male motherhood,” which became increasingly common over
the 19th century: “The artist conceived, was pregnant, labored (in sweat and pain), was
delivered, and (in an uncontrolled ecstasy of agonized—male—control) brought forth. These
were the images of ‘natural’ childbirth that the male creators elaborated.”72 This tendency
reached its climax in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, for whom a genius was “one who
either begets or gives birth spiritually,” while an average man who failed to create thus failed to
become “a ‘mother’ type in the grand sense,” but rather resembled “an old maid.” 73 For
Nietzsche, however, a woman who “dabbled” in art lost “her instincts,”74 and her education
“defeminized” her.75 These representations of genius and creativity thus commandeered, for
male creators, inherently female attributes, while simultaneously constricting women’s creative
capacities to the physical act of procreation. Battersby offers the words of Frank Barron, a
lauded expert on the psychology of creativity, as a more recent textual example that underscores
this ironic exclusion:
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The creative act is a kind of giving birth, and it is noteworthy that as an historical
fact intellectual creativity has been conspicuously lacking in women, whose
products are their children. At the risk of making too much of a linguistic
parallel, it might be said that nature has literally arranged a division of labour.
Men bring forth ideas, paintings, literary and musical compositions . . . while
women bring forth the new generation.76
As Mark Rose reminds us in his insightful article on “Mothers and Authors,” the
analogy of authorship to procreation invokes the gendered mind/body (male/female,
intellect/matter) dichotomy, with the necessary implication that “authorship is a gendered
category.”77 Rose notes that the author’s right, in copyright law, to have his name attached to a
work he created is known as the “right to paternity.”78 Authorial attribution is the right to be
identified and to so protect the patrilineal line, as it were. Indeed, copyright is replete with
parental metaphors: the author “originates,” “creates,” and “labours”; he acquires rights of
“reproduction”; he defends his propriety with claims of “independent creation”; when his
identity is unknown, his work is described as “orphaned.” The filial relation represents the
origin and legitimacy of the intellectual offspring, and the rightful claims of the author-parent.
The presence of these metaphors within copyright’s most fundamental doctrines should alert us
to the gendered nature of copyright. It should also provoke us to ask what work these concepts
are doing in shaping the development of the law and its application.
William Patry has also rued the “creation-as-birth” metaphor and, in particular, the way
in which is wielded in the copyright domain to suggest that authors should enjoy extensive
control over their works.79 In urging the passage of the Statute of Anne, Daniel Defoe declared:
“A Book is the Author’s Property, ‘tis the Child of his Inventions, the Brat of his Brain; . . . ’tis
as much his own, as his Wife and Children.”80 We see here the ideological link of the Romantic
author-genius to the author-owner who features so prominently in modern copyright discourse:
copyright’s protagonist is a surviving figure of “patriarchal domesticity; the author as master of
his household.”81 The relationship conjured between the male author-mother and the text-child
is not one of nurturing, maternal love, but paternal ownership combined with the power of
market alienation. The oft-quoted words of Nathaniel Shaler exemplify this link between
paternity and property: “The man who brings out of the nothingness some child of his thought,
has rights therein which cannot belong to any other sort of property.”82 The common merging of
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the (ostensibly incompatible) childbirth and property metaphors, still characteristic of much
modern day copyright rhetoric, can be understood only when seen through the prism of
patriarchy.
From a feminist perspective, of course, the childbirth metaphor could be reimagined to
yield alternative conclusions about the relationship of author to text. Rather than a bond based
on single-sexed origination, patrilineal lineage, and enduring control, childbirth for the
biological mother requires an inevitable letting go: the cutting of the umbilical cord, nurturing,
raising and preparing the child to go out into the world, to speak on its own behalf, to interact
and form relations with others, to have children of its own. Perhaps, then, the creation-aschildbirth metaphor can be used critically to reimagine the relationship between author and text,
and between texts in the ongoing process of cultural creation. Mark Rose makes a similar
argument by emphasizing, rather than the relationship of mother and child, the modern
understanding of human genetics:
[T]he paternity metaphor obscures the fact that literary works are the products of
complex collaborations in which many individuals are involved . . . , and that
literary works are produced through acts of generation that involve the
adaptation and transformation of materials from the literary gene pool rather than
creation out of nothingness. . . . The paternity metaphor is patriarchal and
obsolete. More significantly, the entire conception of authorship embedded in the
paternity trope is obsolete. We need a better biology of authorship.83
Either conceptual approach is an attempt to disrupt the “male motherhood” metaphor that
shaped Romantic conceptions of genuine authorship, and pervaded legal discourse in the
justification of authors’ rights. Both illustrate the way in which copyright law, freed from
gendered notions of authorship and genius, might evolve to better reflect the processes of
intellectual creativity and the dynamic nature of the text.

IV.

A Feminist Aesthetics for Copyright Law?

I have suggested, in the preceding sections, that copyright law is not aesthetically
neutral, despite common claims that it demands no aesthetic evaluation of the works to which it
extends. I have argued that, in fact, copyright law is dominated by a Romantic aestheticism that
venerates originality and denigrates derivative expression. I have also shown, I hope, that
copyright’s dominant aesthetic theory, and the implicit assumptions about creators and their
works that it generates, are not neutral or gender-free. In fact, the trope of romantic authorship
and the related idea of “genius” are radically gendered—and the notion of the author-genius as
rightful owner is fundamentally patriarchal. If copyright’s protagonist is revealed to be a
83
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surviving figure of patriarchal mythology, and if the structures of copyright law were developed
to reward and encourage his efforts, then perhaps the feminist must conclude that copyright law
is simply “rotten to the core;” it cannot be redeemed but must be discarded.
At best, the feminist must concede that copyright law, in its modern form, was a law
written by men, for men. Certainly, in copyright’s formative era, the powers that it granted
vested in male authors. By refusing most women the legal status or benefits of proprietors, the
law denied most female authors the proprietary relationship with their texts enjoyed by their
male counterparts.84 The practical distance thus produced between women’s creative practices
and the market may also have produced, in a sense, a psychological distance, a space of
resistance, between the cultural creativity and its commoditization.85 Regarded in this way, it
would not be surprising to find that women’s relationship to their texts acquired a different
hue—one that is not accurately reflected in the proprietary structures of control maintained by
the copyright system. Anne Bartow captures this idea powerfully when she states: “Copyright
laws were written by men to embody a male vision of the ways in which creativity and
commerce should intersect.”86
And so, it remains to be asked, how might a feminist aesthetic be brought to bear in the
copyright realm to challenge and change the way in which the law now regulates creative
expression? To be clear, there is no unified definition or substance to the category of feminist
aesthetics that could produce a single answer to such a question. Rather, it embraces a wide
array of perspectives that seek, in various ways, to question seemingly gender neutral
philosophical theories and assumptions about art and aesthetic categories, ideas about artists and
aesthetic value, and the influences of power in the social formation of the situated subject.87 As
this would suggest, the avenues of possible critique in the field of copyright law are manifold,
and their potential implications are as diverse as the perspectives that inform them.
So, for example, copyright’s subject matter categories could be critically examined on
the basis of the works that they privilege as part of copyright’s “core,” and those that they
marginalize or exclude. Consider, again, how copyright has tackled the categorization of
“artistic works” when troubled by the utilitarian products lurking at the margins. As Yen
demonstrated, it has done so by employing (while denying) the use of traditional aesthetic
theories. An approach grounded in traditional “formal” aesthetics might ask whether the work
generates an aesthetic response in people; feminist theorists might ask, “what people?”, and
challenge the notion of art as autonomous from moral or political concerns. After all, aesthetic
responses, tied up as they are with judgments of beauty, have tended to assign women the role
of bearers of meaning under the male gaze, rather than makers of meaning. A feminist
“reception theory” would instead seek to understand the art’s relationship to its cultures—the
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political, social, religious, economic, and aesthetic responses that it generates—rather than to
define it within categories.88 A traditional “intentionalist” approach would inquire into the
purposes of the work’s creator; a feminist theorist might ask why the function of covering a bed,
for example, is less worthy than the function of achieving professional accolades or making
money.89 Whose purpose is privileged, and when can art transcend purpose? An “institutionlist”
aesthetic theory might be brought to bear to examine whether a work is accorded the status of
art in the artworld; a feminist aesthetics would reveal that “work by women that seems identical
in value to work by men may not be [considered] art (or good art) when the artworld’s filters
contain social biases about women along with precepts about art.”90
In this way, it becomes evident, I think, that using feminist aesthetics to problematize
the underlying assumptions at work in defining copyright’s categories could challenge some of
copyright’s exclusionary ideals and practices, and precipitate a re-evaluation of many forms of
expression that are relegated to copyright’s margins or excluded from its protective sphere as
art’s Other. Similarly, the use of feminist aesthetic theories to unsettle ideas of independent
creation could offer new ways of thinking about and assessing standards of “originality.”
Whereas courts traditionally look for the absence of copying as the sine qua non of legal
protection, a feminist approach that “returns art to its social contexts,”91 might reveal the ways
in which even identical reproductions can resituate prior works, lending them “new” meanings
across space and time. Deconstructing the Romantic division between origination and imitation
could thus suggest alternative standards for measuring expressive worth and assessing the need
for encouragement and protection. For example, feminist aesthetics, which also emphasizes the
connections within and between communities of artists, might support a more relational
approach to the originality determination—one that views the work, not in isolation, but in
dialogic relation to the other works on which it is based or to which it responds. 92 And, of
course, by dismantling the myth of solitary authorship, feminist aesthetics would pave the way
to a new appreciation and valorization of art produced cooperatively, collaboratively, or
collectively (whether in concert or separated by space and time). 93 Broadly speaking, in the
copyright domain, as elsewhere, “with the help of feminist aesthetics we are able to appreciate
old things in new ways and to assimilate new things that would be excluded by traditional
aesthetic theory.”94
The intent here, it should be stressed, is not to extend copyright to cover more forms of
expression (and so to impose more expressive limits on others). Just as the critical enterprise of
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feminist aesthetics does not stand or fall by proving some kind of parity with male literary or
artistic “genius,” a feminist critique of copyright does not succeed or fail with its ability to
extend the privileges of copyright protection to more women authors or predominantly female
creative practices. Rather, by bringing feminist aesthetics into the heated debates around
copyright law, we can critically re-evaluate the theoretical underpinnings of a copyright system
based on gendered assumptions about creativity, economic reward, exclusion, and control.
V.

Conclusion

Our copyright system is not aesthetically agnostic. Its willingness to protect the most
mundane of works is not a basis on which to conclude that the law makes no aesthetic
judgment. Nor is the fact that copyright attaches to “every original literary, dramatic, musical
and artistic work” a reason to believe that the extraordinary protections it affords are neutral and
unbiased. In fact, the reach—and the very rationale—of copyright are informed by the aesthetic
theories that dominated at its inception and prevailed throughout its most formative years.
Copyright’s commitment to independent origination, its conception of protectable subject
matter, its insistence upon proprietary reward—all the most fundamental assumptions stitched
into the complex quilt of copyright—are cut from the cloth of romantic aestheticism.
For the copyright theorist, this suggests the need to critically reevaluate copyright’s
norms and effects through an interdisciplinary lens. It demands that we draw on insights from
the fields of aesthetics and the philosophy of art, literary and music theory, for example, to
problematize and ultimately improve the law’s understanding of the creative self, expressive
practices, and intellectual products. For the feminist theorist, however, the recognition of
copyright’s dominant aesthetic theory also reveals its inherently gendered nature, suggesting the
need to identify and disrupt the masculinist assumptions and patriarchal structures supported
and preserved by the legal construct of copyright. It demands that we focus our interdisciplinary
lens on the critical feminist insights and activities that have disrupted and deconstructed
conventional knowledge and practice across disciplines. In particular, as I have argued here, a
turn towards the field of feminist aesthetics could bring the promise of a quite radically
reimagined copyright system. If we remain within the horizons of the Romantic myth, however,
we will only be able to progress so far.95
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